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Introduction
The October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty-the first substantial defence review in over a decade and the first time that strategy regarding defence, security and intelligence had been formally integrated into a single review-has inevitably attracted a substantial amount of commentary.
1 Much of it has focused on individual case studies-be it on a particular equipment programme, the plight of service personnel and their families, or a particular geographical area to be affected by the cuts. We do not propose to go over what is rapidly becoming old ground in this regard.
Instead, we examine the politics of the SDSR-that is, the party politics and the political dynamics of the review process, focused on the government's mission to reduce the 'historic deficit', and the centralisation of defence policy. We also examine the political philosophy that is currently being implemented across Whitehall in which defence is emerging as a pathfinding issue area for a new kind of post-industrial bureaucratic environment typified by a 'thin-client' and 'smart customer' function that interacts with industry.
Party politics
The SDSR was the first major defence review since New Labour's 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which had been well received by practitioners and commentators alike. The SDR had taken over a year to produce and had taken on board a wealth of external and expert views. Indeed, it was characterised at the time as being the most open defence review ever conducted in the United Kingdom. 2 It was also to a significant degree foreign-policy-led, premised on the idea that there needed to be a strategic refocusing of defence to match up to the post-Cold War realities of a changed geostrategic picture; the Cold War reality had been dangerous but stable, this new reality was dangerous and unstable. In one sense, then, little has changed in the overall framing of defence questions between the SDR and the SDSR: the international system is still dangerous and it is still unstable. After the certainties of the Cold War, the strategic environment in 2010, as in 1998, was characterised by uncertainty.
A key advance made by the 1998 SDR was in the beginning of 'jointery': the connection of joint working structures both within the British armed forces and then between them and their European and NATO colleagues (much of this thinking tied in with the efforts to reinvigorate the European defence projects, which culminated in the 1998 St Malo Accords and the 2000 Nice Treaty). As befitted a government that held very positive attitudes towards the European Union (EU), rather too much emphasis was placed on the EU as a source of force multiplication for Britain-collaborative procurement projects with the EU would produce better equipment at a better price, and joint working would eventually drum out the The origins of many of the problems faced by the SDSR are to be found in the SDR. MoD, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and, of course, the record-breaking deficit being carried forward by the Treasury. Whilst a long period of reflection on defence, akin to that which preceded the SDR, was probably necessary, and almost certainly desirable, the coalition government's insistence on prioritising rapid deficit reduction in effect outweighed all other considerations. The MoD was quickly identified as a department ripe for budgetary cuts, and from evidence we collected from officials in the MoD, they were under no illusion that the main driver of the review was financial, and their job was to provide the best review in this context.
At the same time, whilst the SDSR was accused of being conducted overly hastily, it is possible to trace its recommendations and intellectual antecedents back through the previous three years' worth of Conservative party announcements and policy developments.
It is interesting to note how much of the intellectual framing work of the SDSR had been done prior to the review process commencing. In opposition, the Conservative party had promised a defence review, and had produced their own national security Green Paper in January 2010 4 with the intention that this would provide much of the foundational thinking for the SDSR. Thus the timing of the review, which was to come out just before the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), was an attempt to demonstrate how the SDSR was the result of a considerable period of policy gestation and so emphasise its strategic dimension. It is interesting to note, however, that most of the contributing authors to the January 2010 Conservative Green Paper were not party to the government's review. What we can observe in the aftermath of the review are differences on the minutiae of the specific proposals. One example of this can be found in the Labour party's newfound enthusiasm for codifying the military covenant, which seemed to emerge at the moment when the coalition government had appeared to back out of a pledge by David Cameron to make the covenant legally enforceable. The government were keen not to be caught on the hooks of having established a superior set of standards for one group of citizens, to be able to be held legally accountable for this duty of care and to have established an ill-defined benchmark for the media and their political opponents to constantly reference. Between the three major parties there were, however, no real disagreements about the need to produce defence spending cuts, or about the need to reform the defence sector.
The internal dynamics of the Review: centralisation to the core In the wake of this, the PASC has also established a review into how the civil service is managed, and how it will develop in the post-CSR era. We have been told that this is partly inspired by the case of defence management, where those involved believe that the transformation from a technocrat-led MoD to one subject to short-termism and dislocation to the Cabinet Office and Downing Street risks introducing serious failings into defence public policy making. So, it appears that the decision to keep very close control over the SDSR, contrary to the 1998 experience with the SDR, has generated significant unintended consequences: the squabbling between the three services was unedifying and unfortunate, but 
Political philosophy: the Defence Reform Unit-delivering transformative change
The DRU was established in August 2010, alongside the SDSR but ostensibly to follow on from the Review, to examine the shape, structure, management and governance of the MoD.
The work of the DRU is described by the MoD as one of the Secretary of State's three key priorities (the other two being Afghanistan and the SDSR), and the Steering Group of the unit was chaired by Lord Peter Levene, the former Chief of Defence Procurement. Levene's formidable reputation in defence circles led to MoD insiders seeing it as prefacing a large round of budgetary cuts and disposals, particularly in the estates. The precise detail of this concern was wrong, but the sentiment is right: Levene's unit has worked as a large engine for change in the MoD and the reforms that it will recommend in the summer of 2011 will fundamentally change the way the Ministry does its work, with the clear potential to ripple out across the rest of Whitehall as well. Levene's unit seeks to create what will amount to a paradigm shift in the way the civil service operates-'delivering the big change now', as one official put it. The DRU has been staffed by MoD civil servants, who took a responsive stance to the unit members, taking instructions and responding to their lead rather than bringing MoD institutional memory to the unit. In the event, the DRU has focused on transforming the governance of the MoD, working on the assumption that if it finds a new and workable solution then effective managers will deliver the sort of changes that the new politics of the coalition-with attendant economic savings-demands.
The DRU has taken its transformative role seriously and has put in place a defence infrastructure that officials believe is better able to interact with (as a so-called 'thin-client'), and respond to its commercial partners up to and including these institutions (mainly Defence Procurement at Abbeywood, Bristol, and the new Defence Infrastructure Organisation, DIO) being privatised. The two options being considered by the DRU are the imposition of a privately owned and run interface organisation (which would be unpaid and would derive its money from savings) from existing large-scale providers, or the retention of a 'thin-client' defence client playing an 'intelligent customer' role with private industry. Rather than utilising the talents within the MoD, this intelligent customer would seek outside talent and pay them exceptionally well. This sort of private sector thinking has come directly from the DRU steering group.
The thin-client model and the direct privatisation of these organisations would be a significant development in British defence politics, which has seen a large amount of commercial activity coming into the defence realm from the privatisation of core defence research capabilities (DERA to QINETIQ), private facilities management of MoD offices and establishments, and the private provision of defence education and training. The question of how large the market would be for the contract to run an interface organisation also gets to the heart of how viable such a proposal is. If the DIO was replaced or run by a private provider, one suspects that there would not be a great advantage-after all, commercial acumen is only likely to get the organisation so far, and competition is far more important to the logic of privatisation than just placing managers with commercial experience in certain positions, even if the intention is to leave an 'intelligent customer function' within the MoD.
It is said that the DRU's plan for making such a venture cost-saving is not just through greater efficiency (the sort they naturally expect commercially aware individuals to manage), but also because the organisation will receive no public money for their management activities: the profit for the company will come in making savings that they will be able to keep. It is not clear whether there is the necessary political support for such a venture, and so it is likely that any future privatisation of this function might have to follow the regional contracts model currently run in the MoD, so that there were a greater number of companies bidding for the work, which could then deliver the intended efficiency savings.
The general trend towards industry collaborations permeates all branches of the defence community, from the manager of sensitive sites suggesting private solutions to facilities management at these sites, to the MoD's consultation website posing questions about what further roles industry might take in the delivery of defence functions. 11 But the cross-Whitehall proposals in this regard will be even more radical. The work of the so-called 'Shareholder Executive' (SHAREX), which is reviewing the government's land-holdings, is, we are told, taking a radical approach to the future of government land, including to Whitehall itself. Whilst SHAREX is formally separate from the defence estates, this kind of radicalism-or as one official put it 'the desperate measures for desperate times'-clearly has the potential to be applied to other areas of government activity. This is the rewiring of British governance, a further step in the hollowing out of the state: a reduction to a contract negotiating and grant-giving function, whilst the implementation of government functions is entirely held by private or charitable organisations.
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The transformation the DRU has sought in the MoD also extends to its division into three teams, Adopting the model that is to be piloted in defence would deliver the year-on-year savings the government says are necessary, but it would also reduce the size of the civil servicesomething that government politicians (of both colours) are wedded to for ideological reasons.
Conclusion
The SDSR represents an interesting moment politically. There was a surprising amount of cross-party agreement-certainly on the fundamentals, if not the detail of the SDSRalthough the government made the error of appearing to U-turn on the issue of bringing the military covenant into law in April 2011, which allowed the covenant to become the issue on which both major parties have fought for the high ground on defence. The Labour party opposition now believes it has a weighty political stick with which to beat the government in the area of defence policy, which they hope will assist in resurrecting their 'strong on defence' credentials, which Tony Blair worked hard to develop but which were severely damaged by the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact that the SDSR was closed and More widely, and we believe more significantly, the SDSR (in parallel with other government reviews) is heralding a new form of bureaucratic governance in the United Kingdom. The SDSR process provides an excellent example of the way that government functions are being centralised, but as a prelude to privatisation and the shrinking of the state rather than as an end in itself; the control of the Review by the Cabinet Office and Treasury undermines the MoD's claim to expertise and ownership of defence issues, something which had changed between February and October 2010, and can only be put down to the change of administration. The work of the DRU represents a paradigm shift in the way that bureaucratic functions will take place in the future. The DIO has been established with its eventual privatisation in mind, and the plans for MoD governance are all geared at providing a thinclient and intelligent customer function (so contract negotiation and management, but no actual implementation done in house), with employees being brought in with commercial experience, rather than re-skilling existing civil servants. This is not so much the shrinking of the state, as the wholesale replacement of the state with private contractors. What happens in defence governance has the clear potential to be replicated across the whole of government, representing a critical loss of the public-service-oriented technical expertise and nimbleness that is vital in fighting wars.
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